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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1A

SUBJECT : NIE 11-8-65: SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR
STRATEGIC ATTACK

1. The attached terms of reference are forwarded for review.
2. It is requested that your representatives meet with us at 1400, Monday, 28 June, at CIA Headquarters, to discuss these terms.

3. You are requested to call [redacted] Extension [redacted] by 1000, Monday, 28 June, giving her the names of your representatives and certifying the appropriate level of clearance. It is also requested that your representatives enter the building at the Main Entrance.

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Executive Officer
National Estimates

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

cc: Colonel [redacted] USA (ACSI)
Captain [redacted] USN (ONI)
Colonel [redacted] , USAF (AFNIEOB)

Declass Review by NIMA / DoD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

23 June 1965

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 11-8-65: SOVIET CAPABILITIES
FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic attack forces through mid-1967 and to estimate general trends in these forces over the next decade or so.

SCOPE AND METHOD

1. This all-source estimate will supersede NIE 11-8-64, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack, dated 8 October 1964, and the Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-8-64, dated 7 April 1965. Contributions are due in ONE by close of business, Monday, 9 August. They should be given simultaneous distribution to all interested USIB agencies and committees.

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2. Like its predecessors, this estimate will be an all-source account of the current and future status of Soviet forces for long-range attack, and of policy and doctrine for their use. Contributors are requested to incorporate all available evidence on each matter discussed into a single all-source document. Sources should be identified by type and classification for guidance in preparing a TOP SECRET version of the estimate. Contributors are also requested to make a clear distinction between estimates which can be supported with confidence on the basis of direct evidence and those which cannot.

3. We plan to estimate detailed numerical strengths only to mid-1967, and deal with the period beyond primarily in terms of force goals and trends. Detailed projections for later years will be provided in the IAP. It will be noted that the proposed schedule for completion of this estimate and Section I of the IAP requires that the two papers be prepared concurrently. It is requested, therefore, that GMAIC, JAEIC, and SIC include in their contributions to 11-8 such additional material (particularly on future systems) as may be required for an updating of those portions of Section I of the IAP which lie within their respective jurisdictions. The updating of the other portions of Section I will be the subject of supplemental terms of reference; the due date for these contributions is tentatively set for 2-3 weeks after the due date for NIE 11-8 contributions.

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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. TRENDS IN POLICY AND DOCTRINE OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS

A. How do the Soviets conceive of the role of strategic attack forces in relation to the broad objectives of their external policy? Are there any indications of change in these views?

B. In the Soviet view what strategic purposes are to be served by long-range striking forces?
retaliation?

C. Discuss the USSR's allocation of resources to the strategic attack mission, and among weapon systems within this mission. How are general economic factors and the allocation of resources to other military programs likely to affect Soviet programs for strategic attack forces?

D. Discuss the possible effects on Soviet decisions of quantitative and qualitative development of US and other Western strategic offensive and defensive capabilities.

E. What are major technological factors which will shape Soviet strategic attack forces during this period? What technological developments might lead to departures in general policies and doctrine?

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F. How do the Soviets probably view their requirements for strategic attack forces -- both qualitative and quantitative. Taking account of technical and economic factors, discuss in general terms the force goals and weapons mixes which they might seek to meet these requirements, and the probable broad trends in Soviet strategic attack forces over the next ten years.

II. COMMAND AND CONTROL

A. How do the Soviets direct, control, and coordinate the several elements of their strategic attack forces? What are the mechanisms used to effect this control? What provisions have been made to insure the survival of a command structure? What fail-safe measures are in effect?

B. Discuss the capabilities and weaknesses of the strategic command structure. Of its communications systems. What developments can be expected?

C. Discuss the adequacy of Soviet target intelligence. How are targets allocated among the various strategic attack forces?

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D. Discuss Soviet practices with respect to storage, logistics, and control of nuclear weapons and their effect on strategic attack capabilities.

III. SOVIET ICBM PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT

A. Discuss Soviet ICBM production, its location, scale, and pace.

B. Describe current Soviet ICBM deployment, giving numbers, types, and operational status of confirmed complexes and launchers.

C. Briefly trace the course of Soviet ICBM deployment, emphasizing developments over about the past year, and including:

1. Pace and extent of deployment by type.
2. Evidence of change or modification of existing sites.
3. Evidence of discontinuity or disruption in deployment and possible explanations therefor.
4. Any further evidence relating to large, soft site construction.

D. Assess the quality of the evidence bearing on ICBM deployment in terms of coverage, timeliness, and reliability.

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1. Discuss and evaluate the evidence of additional ICBM deployment at other suitable locations. What is the likelihood of such deployment?
2. Include a discussion of the possibility of deception or concealment.

E. Discuss the available evidence relating to the hardening of Soviet ICBM sites, including: site configuration and measurements; structural features, external and internal; the method of launching missiles; control of launch groups.

1. Estimate the degree of hardening of Soviet hard ICBM sites of all types. Discuss the vulnerability of Soviet hard sites to nuclear effects other than overpressure.

IV. SOVIET ICBM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

A. Briefly describe developments over about the past year in the expansion or modification of facilities on the Tyuratam test range, relating where possible to ICBM systems development.

B. Briefly discuss ICBM development programs at Tyuratam in terms of scale, intensity, duration, and success, emphasizing events of the past year.

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C. Discuss the ICBMs shown in the Moscow V-E Day parade and relate to developments on the test range or at operational complexes. Does this or other evidence indicate the development of new systems which have not yet reached flight testing?

D. Discuss other R and D activities which may relate to the ICBM program -- in particular, any solid propellant or large booster development.

E. Estimate characteristics for the SS-10, and discuss its probable role in the ICBM program.

F. Estimate characteristics and IOC dates for the newer systems -- i.e. those in an earlier stage of development than the SS-10.

G. What system is intended for deployment in the large silos? In the small silos? At Plesetsk?

H. Discuss probable trends in ICBM development over the next ten years, including likely new systems and the possible modification or improvement of existing systems.

V. ESTIMATED SOVIET ICBM CAPABILITIES

A. Estimate Soviet strength in operational ICBM launchers from mid-1965 through mid-1967, distinguishing ICBM systems deployed

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and hard and soft launchers. Consider in this connection the operational status of Tyuratam launchers and their possible use as part of the operational force.

B. Assess the operational capabilities of the current Soviet ICBM force in terms of:

1. Readiness, reaction time, and refire capability.
2. Reliability.
3. Accuracy.
4. Survivability.
5. Nuclear payloads.
6. Penetration aids and multiple warheads.
7. Crew training and proficiency.
8. Support -- communications, logistics, maintenance, repair cycles.

C. Discuss improvements in these capabilities likely to occur over the next ten years.

D. Considering probable Soviet force goals, discuss trends in ICBM deployment over the next 10 years. Describe in general terms the probable composition of the Soviet ICBM force in 1970 and 1975. Use ranges or alternatives as appropriate.

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VI. SOVIET MRBM/IREM PROGRAMS

A. The general questions posed above for ICBM programs are applicable. Thus, contributions are requested on the following subjects:

1. MRBM/IREM deployment -- pace and extent of these programs, systems and configurations deployed, current confirmed deployment.
2. MRBM/IREM production.
3. Characteristics of hard sites.
4. Quality of evidence -- possibility of deception or concealment.
5. MRBM/IREM research and development -- test range activity, other related R and D activity, evidence of follow-on systems or of modifications to existing systems.
6. Estimated characteristics and IOC dates of follow-on systems.
7. Estimated MRBM/IREM force mid-1965 to mid-1967.
8. Operational capabilities of the current force and future improvements.
9. Probable MRBM/IREM force goals and estimated trends in deployment over the next ten years.

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B. In addition, contributors should consider certain questions associated primarily with MREMs/IREMs, including:

1. Estimated characteristics and operational status of scamp missile shown in Moscow V-E Day parade.
2. Implications of development and deployment of solid-fueled MREM/IREM. Of mobile systems.
3. Significance of the abandonment of some MREM/IREM sites.
4. Recent evidence on the development and use of fixed field sites; apparent purpose of these sites; probable future developments.
5. Target coverage in Eurasia.
6. Possible effects of political developments, particularly, the Sino-Soviet dispute, on MREM/IREM deployment.

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VII. SUBMARINE LAUNCHED MISSILE SYSTEMS*

A. Discuss the several missile submarine deployment programs including:

1. Types of ballistic and cruise missile submarines now operational and their deployment.
2. Evidence on their development and IOC dates.
3. The apparent missions of the several submarine/missile systems.

B. Evaluate recent trends in the missile submarine force, with particular attention to:

1. The construction of nuclear vs. diesel-powered submarines.
2. The construction of ballistic vs. cruise missile submarines.
3. Changes in geographic distribution by fleet area.

* It is requested that SIC obtain the participation of NPIC (including PID and PAG), NRTSC, and DIA in preparing its contribution on missile submarine characteristics.

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C. Discuss the evidence of missile submarine production including:

1. Production capacity of Soviet shipyards and percentage of this capacity being used.
2. Possible limiting factors -- reactor or other component production, nuclear technology, stainless steel supplies, hull plate fabrication equipment, etc.
3. Status of conversion programs.

D. Estimate characteristics for missile systems presently employed in Soviet submarines. Is there any evidence of Soviet difficulties with these systems?

E. Discuss recent research and development activity relating to missile submarine systems including:

1. Status of Serb and Sark.
2. Test range activity.
3. Evidence of new submerged-launch systems. Of solid propellant developments. Of longer range systems.
4. Status of large new submarine estimated to be a ballistic missile type.

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5. Supporting scientific research -- oceanography, acoustics, hull design, etc.

F. Estimate characteristics and IOC dates for new missile submarine systems.

G. In the light of estimated Soviet development, production, and deployment capabilities, estimate numbers and types of Soviet missile submarines for the period to mid-1967.

H. What is the probable Soviet view of their requirement -- both qualitative and quantitative -- for missile submarines for strategic attack against US and Eurasian targets?

I. Considering probable force goals, estimate trends in the Soviet missile submarine forces over the next ten years.

J. Discuss operational characteristics of the Soviet missile submarine force and probable future developments. Include in this discussion:

1. Missile submarine operations -- operational areas, frequency of patrols, evidence on endurance, and reliability.

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2. Readiness of the force -- repair cycles for missile submarines.
3. Submarine base and repair facilities -- mobile and dispersed bases, submarine pens, the submarine auxiliary fleet, resupply capabilities.
4. Manning requirements, training facilities, quality of the crews.
5. Communications.
6. Noise propagation characteristics.
7. Other equipment characteristics which may affect operations -- air scrubbers, water distillers, propulsion systems, navigational equipment, sensors, etc.

VIII. LONG-RANGE AVIATION

A. Describe the present size, composition, and basing of Soviet Long-Range Aviation.

B. Discuss the major missions including a consideration of:

1. Geographic disposition.
2. Arctic exercises -- numbers and types of aircraft involved, unit designations.

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3. Extent of Long-Range bomber participation in naval operations.
4. Other training activity.
5. Implications of the probable transfer of heavy bombers to Naval Aviation.
6. Operational doctrine, particularly with respect to stand-off missiles and low altitude flight profiles.

C. Estimate performance characteristics for current aircraft types and airborne weapons.

D. Estimate current Soviet production of long-range bombers. Discuss the evidence of modernization and conversion programs. What is the outlook for such programs?

E. Discuss the evidence of Soviet research and development on follow-on long-range bombers and on advanced ASMs, and estimate the likelihood, nature, and IOC dates of such systems.

F. Estimate the size and composition of Soviet Long-Range Aviation for the period mid-1965 to mid-1967.

G. How do the Soviets probably view their requirements for long-range bombers. Considering probable force goals, estimate trends in Soviet Long Range Aviation over the next ten years.

Describe in general terms the probable composition of the force in 1970 and 1975.

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H. Discuss operational characteristics of the current force and probable future developments including:

1. Adequacy of training and general level of proficiency, including in-flight refueling.
2. Alert procedures and operational readiness.
3. LRA home base facilities -- maintenance and supply capabilities -- repair cycles.
4. Capabilities of Arctic bases to support staging operations -- POL storage, navigational aids, base capacity, supporting facilities, usage by elements of LRA
5. Communications.
6. Navigational equipment.
7. ECM equipment and penetration aids.

I. Considering the size, composition and operational characteristics of the force and training patterns, estimate present LRA capabilities against the continental US, North America, and Eurasia.

J. Discuss probable changes in capabilities, mission, and disposition as the period progresses.

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IX. OTHER STRATEGIC ATTACK CAPABILITIES

A. Is there any evidence which would change the conclusions on space weapons systems in paragraphs 64-68 of NIE 11-1-65?

B. Is there any evidence affecting the conclusions on the strategic use of biological weapons in NIE 11-6-64?

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